

REPORT NO. 116

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

10 May 44

OPERATION "JUBILEE" THE RAID ON DIEPPE, 19 AUG 42
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM GERMAN SOURCES

1. The operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42, was dealt with in detail in Reports Nos. 100, 101, 108 and 109. These reports sum up the information available from our own sources, and were made as complete as possible.
2. By good fortune, certain enemy documents relating to the operation have recently become available. The manner in which these documents were obtained is not known to the writer, but it seems probable that they were captured by Allied troops in North Africa or in Italy. They were obtained by M.I. Section, CMHQ, from SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) - an establishment which, in view of the prospective operations in north-west Europe with which it is concerned, doubtless found them of very great interest.
3. Copies of translations of the documents concerned are attached as Appendices "A", "B" and "C". The documents are as follows:

Appendix "A" "Intelligence Report (Ic-Bericht) on British landing at DIEPPE on 19 Aug 42" (22 Aug 42).

"B" "Combat Report and Experiences Gained (Gefechts - und Erfahrungsbericht) during British Attack on DIEPPE 19 Aug 1942" (25 Aug 42).

"C" Comments on (b) by various German Headquarters, 2-28 Sep 42 (chiefly concerned with improvement of German defences).

Facsimiles of the German text will be found on CMHQ file 3/DIEPPE/1.

4. The acquisition of these documents is a great advantage from the historical point of view. They afford us a fairly complete picture of the German Order of Battle and dispositions in the DIEPPE area previous to the raid, and a narrative, complete at least in outline, of the measures taken by the enemy command to deal with our attack. These reports, in fact, fill to

considerable extent the most important gaps remaining in our knowledge of the operation, and afford us information which would not ordinarily have been available until the publication of a German official history or until German military archives become available for examination. It should be noted, however, that they bear dates immediately following the raid, and are therefore not the products of very long or careful investigation.

5. The additions to our information contributed by these papers are discussed in detail below.

"THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL"

THE GERMAN DEFENCE OF DIEPPE

a. Security and Surprise.

6. In Report No. 109 (paras 14-23) the question of whether or not the enemy had any advance information of the operation was discussed at length, and the conclusion was reached that he had no such information. These make no reference whatever to knowledge that the operation has been planned to take place earlier in the summer and had been abandoned and later revived (see Report No. 100). It is made quite clear, moreover, that the first information of the actual attack received by the German defenders was the result of the encounter with a German convoy (the word used is "Geleitzug") offshore shortly before 0400 hrs British Summer Time (Report No. 101, para 24). Although the point was made in Report No. 101 (para 24). Although the point was made in Report No. 101 (para 26) that we had no evidence that an actual message was passed from the convoy warning the fences, and information from prisoners indicated that at some points the alarm was given more than an hour after the convoy encounter (Report No. 109, para 17, sub-para (iii)), the German Combat Report states specifically that "the entire coast defence system was alerted" as a result of the naval engagement. It is, of course, not impossible that a German report might attempt to gloss over the fact that the alert was not wholly general, if this was in fact the case.

b. German Forces Engaged.

7. The forces at the disposal of the German Command in the DIEPPE area are described in the "Combat Report", pp 1-2. In general, this information confirms that obtained from prisoners after the operation (see Report No. 109, paras 26 ff). It appears, however, that the information from prisoners was in error in placing 3 Bn, 571 Inf Regt at AMBRUMESNIL (Report No. 109, para 29). This battalion is not mentioned in the German documents and does not appear to have been in the area. It is clear that 1 Bn of 571 IR was stationed in the area. It is clear that 1 Bn of 571 IR was stationed in the QUIBER-VILLE area,

and was employed by the Germans for counter-attack against POURVILLE. It was with this unit, mainly, that the Camerons of Canada made contact near BAS DE HAUTOT (Report No. 101, paras 200 ff; Report No. 109, para 30).

8. It is worth noting that the available Corps Reserves included, in addition to three battalions of infantry, a tank company (81 Tk Coy) stationed in the YVETOT area half way between DIEPPE and LE HAVRE. The presence of this unit was not known to our Intelligence.

9. The German troops in the area included a large artillery component. Apart from the fixed defences, however, there appear to have been no particularly heavy guns. The anti-tank guns present were of 37 mm and 47 mm calibre, and the one heavy AA battery referred to was 75 mm. There is no mention of 88 mm guns.

10. In Report No. 109, para 31, Note 2, it is suggested that the presence of No. 3 Versuchskompanie, an experimental unit which was believed to have manned anti-tank defences, might have accounted in part for the stubbornness of the defence. It is interesting to note that "one experimental company of about 60 men" is placed in a very subordinate position in the German list of units. The translator's suggestion that this might possibly be "a penal detachment" is presumably, however, pure conjecture.

c. German Counter-Attacks.

11. German counter-action to the attack may be divided into four distinct phases:

(i) Counter-attack against 3 Commando in the BERNEVAL area.

(ii) Counter-attack by 1 Bn 571 IR against POURVILLE.

(iii) Counter-attack by local reserves to mop up the main beaches in front of DIEPPE after many of our troops had been evacuated.

(iv) Employment of Corps Reserves and 10 Panzer Div.

These attacks will be dealt with in this order.

12. The counter-attack against 3 Commando was placed under the command of OC 302 A Tk Bn, who presumably had at his disposal his own unit, or part of it, in addition to a cycle squadron from ST NICOLAS, a motorized pioneer company from ARQUES LA BATAILLE, and subsequently, a company of infantry. The German account indicates that this counter-attack was effective, and that two officers and 80 men of 3 Commando were captured as a result. It is

interesting that no counter-attack seems to have been attempted against 4 Commando, whose attack on the battery at VARENCEVILLE was the most successful part of the raid.

13. At 0610 hrs (British time) 1 Bn, 571 IR, was ordered to move from QUIBERVILLE to HAUTOT with a view to attacking towards POURVILLE. By 0900 hrs this unit was in the HAUTOT area ready to attack. It was advanced elements of it, along with "the forward Bicycle Platoon of the Regimental Headquarters of the 571st Infantry Regiment" (German Combat Report, p 8) which the Cameroons of Canada encountered in this area about this time (Report No. 101, paras 196 ff). The German battalion, when concentrated following the withdrawal of Cameroons of C to POURVILLE, seems to have been confused by the close country and spent some time in reconnaissance. The enemy report criticizes this unit for slowness, and suggests that a more "prompt and determined" attack towards POURVILLE would have produced better effects. The attack, the report states, was actually launched about 1130 hrs (British time), and the unit "was able to clear the enemy out of the hill West of POURVILLE and to take about 200 prisoners". This is clearly the German counter-attack referred to in Report No. 101, paras 217-18, which drove "C" Coy of the S Sask R off the high ground into the village. After this initial success, the German battalion, we know, did not choose to press the attack against the village, which appears to have been entered in force only after the majority of our troops had re-embarked.

14. The counter-attack against DIEPPE beaches was ordered by the Commander of 571 IR "around noon". This is in accord with information from our own sources, which indicates that the enemy closed in on our own sources, which indicates that the enemy closed in on our troops remaining on the beach about 1300 hrs (British time) and that these troops surrendered at 1308 hrs (Report No. 108, para 262). This attack was delivered, the German account states, by elements of three companies: 5 Coy and part of 571 IR, and two-thirds of 2 Pioneer Coy of 302 Div. Information from prisoners of war (Report No. 109, para 29) suggests that these companies had been in local reserve; 5 Coy is specifically so referred to. No. 7 Coy of IR 571, which prisoners reported as holding RED and WHITE Beaches, is not mentioned by the Germans as participating in the counter-attack.

15. The German account of this counter-attack makes no mention of the fact that it was not delivered until our evacuation was at an end and we had withdrawn several hundred men from RED and WHITES Beaches.

16. The handling of Corps Reserves was as follows. They were placed under command 302 Inf Div and ordered to OFFRANVILLE with a view to an attack towards POURVILLE. This attack, however, was never delivered. Nevertheless, this Corps Reserve (676 IR) took station in the afternoon in the POURVILLE -

ST AUBIN sector, as a precaution "because of the many messages on hand reporting strong formations of ships en route from England". It is interesting to note that the German Combat Report, in spite of the fact that the Germans had the major part of our Operation Order at their disposal, observes that "it is not apparent whether further units were to land, should this attack have been successful". It refers to "the convoy of 26 large boats which left PORTSMOUTH about noon and which later on turned about" as a possible second wave. Nothing is known of this convoy from British sources.

17. The German 10 Panzer Div (which was presumably, though not certainly, at AMIENS, where it had been reported by our Intelligence before the raid (Report No. 100, para 99)) was placed under the command of LXXII Corps at 0950 (1050) hrs and was ordered to move its advanced detachment as rapidly as possible into the area TORCY LE PETIT, 14 km South of DIEPPE. It is of interest to note that the intention of the Corps Commander was in the first instance "to commit the 10th Armoured Division West of the ARQUES River against those enemy troops which had landed at POURVILLE". This attack was never delivered, as the operation was presumably at an end before the Division came up. It stood by in the battle area during the night 19/20 Aug.

18. It may be noted in passing that the movements of German troops reported above were not observed by our tactical reconnaissance aircraft (cf Report No. 109, para 48).

d. German Losses.

19. A matter of special interest is the statement of German losses contained in the Combat Report. This gives the losses of 302 Inf Div (in which, presumably, are included all those of the German Army in the operation) as 67 all ranks killed, 10 all ranks missing and 156 all ranks wounded; while the total losses of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Organization Todt are given as 150 all ranks killed, 15 all ranks missing and 275 all ranks wounded: a grand total of 440 casualties.

20. These figures of German losses found in a secret official document are of great interest, but they cannot be accepted without reserve. For one thing, these losses are actually somewhat smaller than those published in the German High Command Official Communique, which gave the Army losses as 115 dead, 187 wounded, and 14 missing and the grand total of German casualties as 591 men (Report No. 109, para 36). The discrepancy is surprising, for it is curious that the enemy should announce publicly a larger number of casualties than he had actually suffered. It is possible, of course, that during the few days between the issuance of the Communique and that of the Combat Report the figures might have altered somewhat; but it is noticeable that the Communique included very few missing men who could have turned up later and thereby

lowered the total. It is also noticeable that both sets of official German figures are rather too small to make allowance for the personnel losses of the German Air Force in the operation. As noted in Report No. 109 (para 41) the RAF estimate is that 170 German aircraft were lost during the operation, and a large proportion of these were bombers carrying several men each.

21. Although it is perhaps surprising that the enemy should falsify figures in a secret document, it must be remembered that it might be dangerous for him, if only from the point of view of morale, to have it known in the Army that the figures of losses given to the public were notably different from the truth. It is conceivable, therefore, that figures of losses circulated in a document like the Combat Report now under review might be altered before circulation. It should be remembered that the impression left with Canadian prisoners after the operation is that the Germans has in fact suffered heavily (Report No. 109, para 34).

22. It would appear quite possible that we shall never receive a completely reliable account of the German losses at DIEPPE.

23. With respect to the enemy's losses in material, it is interesting to note that he admits the loss, in addition to the six 150 mm coast-defence guns destroyed by 4 Commando, of two French field guns and four 37 mm A Tk guns, two of them of Czech design.

GERMAN COMMENTS ON THE OPERATION

a. British Plan and Tactics

24. The German comments on our operations are not without interest, although it is not necessary to accept them at quite their face value.

25. The enemy's remarks on the captured operation order indicate that he was not impressed by it. These comments are to the effect that it is too detailed and therefore "difficult to visualize as a whole". The Intelligence Report remarks, "the planning down to the last detail limits the independence of action of the subordinate officers and leaves them no opportunity to make independent decisions in an altered situation". Actually, this criticism is less valid than might appear to be the case. Although there is much detail in the order, the action of individual units is not so closely prescribed as a first glance suggests, and the present writer sometimes had difficulty in constructing from it a detailed account of the intended movements. One important example of a commanding officer making "independent decisions in an altered situation" is that of Major Law deciding to advance inland by the left instead of the right bank of the SCIE (Report No. 101, paras 193-195). This alternative route had in fact been discussed in advance, but there is no

reference to this in the actual operation order.

26. It was a source of surprise to the enemy that we did not employ parachutists and airborne troops. As noted in Report No. 100 (para 127), the need for ideal weather for such operations had been a major consideration in eliminating this element from the plan.

27. The German commentator expresses surprise at the British decision to land the main body of the attacking force, including the tanks, directly in front of DIEPPE, and he notes that this decision was taken in spite of our knowledge of the strength of the defences there, as shown on our maps. It is suggested that we relied upon "the massed employment of the Air Force" to shatter the German defence and enable the assault battalions to break through. Actually, as we know, the Air Force attack was limited to cannon fighters, and this proved inadequate. The Germans also note the absence of artillery support for the landing force, and observe, "a few light assault guns would probably have been more use to the British in their first attack, than the tanks". This point has not escaped our own commentators (Report No. 109, para 2, sub-para 335 and 342).

28. The enemy's comments lay particular stress upon the fact that we did not support with tanks the battalions which landed near POURVILLE. Considerable comment is devoted to the failure of the Cameroons to push on to the ST AUBIN airfield and it is suggested that they were halted by the British Commander because the attacks at PUTS and DIEPPE itself had failed. This, as we know, was actually the case (Report No. 101, para 202) although Major Law had already reached an independent decision to withdraw. The Germans do not mention the presence of the artillery which contributed to Major Law's decision, but these infantry guns were presumably pushed forward by 1 Bn, 571 IR (cf above, para 13).

29. Even during the action, the enemy was strongly impressed with the threat to his position represented by our penetration at POURVILLE. This is amply witnessed by the fact that he proposed to direct his armour against our troops in this area (above, para 16).

30. The German commentator observes that in another large raid or an attack on a broader front the British are unlikely to repeat a massed fronted attack against a strongly fortified area such as was attempted at DIEPPE. Instead, he argues, they are likely to "attempt to penetrate weak spots and try to encircle the harbours". Here again it is interesting to compare with the German conclusions the lessons which our own tacticians drew from the operation (Report No. 109, para 2, sub-para 338).

b. Comments on British Intelligence.

31. The Germans were impressed by the excellence of our information concerning their defences, as reflected in our maps based on air photographs. They note, however, that additional information such as could be obtained from secret agents was lacking, and they call attention particularly to our lack of knowledge concerning the location of German Headquarters and to the fact that we mistakenly believed that 110 Inf Div had replaced 302 Inf Div in the DIEPPE area. Div HQ had evidently removed from ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE (where we believed it to be) some months before.

32. Information from MI Section, CMHQ, suggests that while there was information available from agents, it came through very slowly at this period and was unfortunately out of date when received.

c. German Comments on our Operations

33. The German Intelligence Report draws an unflattering comparison between the Canadian troops engaged and the Commandos. Too much need not be made of this. The quality of the Commando troops was very high, and in the case of 4 Commando at VARENCEVILLE they obtained the only unqualified success achieved on land during the operation. This unit, however, was favoured by good fortune did not extend to 3 Commando or to the Canadian troops engaged in the operation. Except at one or two points, it is not clear to the present writer how the Canadians in the circumstances could have accomplished more than they did. That they "surrendered in swarms" is doubtless true, but what the German report fails to make clear is the fact that this took place only after all possible evacuation had been carried out and when the men remaining on the beaches knew that there was no further possibility either of withdrawal or effective resistance.

VARIOUS POINTS OF DETAIL

a. Action of Tanks.

34. It is of special interest to note that the German Combat Report confirms in a rather striking manner the fact reported by Major Page that a large number of our tanks crossed the wall, reached the Promenade and subsequently returned to the beach. Major Page stated that 13 tanks certainly, and probably two more, crossed the wall in this manner (Report No. 108, paras 123-125). The German report states that "probably 16" tanks reached the promenade.

35. In general, moreover, the German evidence confirms that of Major Page concerning the invulnerability of the Churchill tank to the German fire, although the report states that "two holes from 37 mm shells" have been found

in tanks. The German conclusion was that more (and probably heavier) A Tk guns were necessary.

b. Losses of the Attaching Force.

36. The German statement concerning the casualties of the attacking force is interesting. In general, it corresponds only very approximately with our own information. The German Combat Report dated 25 Aug 42 states that "95 officers and 2122 men were captured by the Germans". As noted in Report No. 108, our information more than a year after the operation was that Canadian prisoner's of war, including wounded, numbered 118 officers and 1768 other ranks. Allowing, therefore, for the fact that a certain number of British officers and men were captured in addition, the German figure for officers seems somewhat too low, and that for other ranks somewhat too high. The enemy statement that "475 dead were buried" by 24 Aug is not out of keeping with our own figures (Report No. 108, para 296).

37. The figures given by the enemy for our losses on BLUE BEACH (PUITS) are of special interest, and bear out the impression (Report No. 101, paras 131 ff) that our losses in killed were higher here than in any other sector. The German Combat Report states that "over 150 dead were counted at this point".

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS
APPENDIX "A"

Annex to paragraph 4 of the LXXXI Army Corps HQ
Operations Order, 640/42

Headquarters, LXXXI Army Corps HQ 22 August 1942

Intelligence Station

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON BRITISH LANDING AT DIEPPE ON 19 AUG 42

(Enemy Intentions - Source, Captured Documents)

1. Mission:

- a. To land at 0610 in DIEPPE itself and on both sides of the city under the protection of the Air Force and the Navy.
- b. To occupy the city and the fortified area of DIEPPE.
- c. To push through with infantry and armoured Units to ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE where it was assumed that a Division Command Post was located.

2. Purpose:

- a. The English intended to put the DIEPPE Defence Zone out of action for the longest possible time. It was also their intention to immobilize for some time to comb all military installations, coastal batteries, radio stations, airfields, ships, as well as all utilities (Gas, Electricity, Harbour, Cranes, Railroads).
- b. Furthermore, they envisaged taking the largest possible number of prisoners plus a large variety of military documents, weapons and equipment.
- c. After completing their mission, they were to re-embark by 1530 hours.

3. Commanders:

- a. Commander-in-Chief: presumably Lord Mountbatten.
- b. Commander of Ground Forces: Major General Roberts (His appointment was not identified).
- c. Commander of the 4th Brigade: Brigadier Lett.
- d. Commander of the 6th Brigade: Brigadier Southam.

4. The Task Force Consisted of:

a. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division:

(1) 4th Brigade: (Headquarters 25 men):

- (a) Royal Regiment of Canada (500 men).
- (b) Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (540 men).
- (c) Essex-Scottish Regiment (520 men).

(2) 6th Brigade: (Headquarters 25 men):

(a) Fusiliers Mont-Royal of Canada (560 men).

(b) Camerons of Canada (500 men).

(c) South Saskatchewan Regiment (500 men).

b. Troops Attached to the Task Force (total 1380 men):

(1) Black Watch of Canada (5th Brigade) attached to the 6th Brigade.

(2) Canadian 14th Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment) (58 Tanks).

(3) English Marines (strength unknown).

(4) Canadian Engineer Units (Royal Canadian Engineers) (330 men).

(5) Third Commando (Approximately 360 men).

(6) Fourth Commando (Approximately 225 men)

It is not known whether all units landed in full strength. This was certainly not the case with a part of the attached troops, the Tank Battalion in particular.

5. Plan:

a. The 3rd Commando was supported to land with 4 Assault Parties near BERNEVAL and with 2 Parties in the defile west of BERNEVAL, in order to capture the 2nd Battery (Br Troop) of the 770th CD Artillery Battalion in an attack from both flanks. All Assault Parties were to return to their ships after accomplishing their mission.

b. A landing was to be effected at PUIITS in two waves, the first wave to consist of the Royal Regiment of Canada with one light battery (Br Troop) and one light anti-aircraft assault section; and the second wave was to consist of the Black Watch Battalion. One part of this force was to reduce military objectives eastwards along the coast; a second, to push forward to NEUVILLE, whilst a third

was to take the hill on the East of DIEPPE.

c. Two waves were to land in DIEPPE as follows: the first to be made up of the Essex Scots, the Hamiltons, the 14th Army Tank Battalion and Canadian Engineer units; the second, of the Fusiliers Mont Royal.

(1) The Essex Scots with one tank platoon (Br Troop) had the task of taking the eastern portion of DIEPPE and the harbour area. The remaining two battalions and the tank battalion, less one platoon (Br Troop), were to take the western part of DIEPPE and the hill west of DIEPPE, then to seize the high ground, ST AUBIN-ARQUES LA BATAILLE, since it was assumed that the 110th Infantry Division had its headquarters in the latter town. The Canadian Engineers were supposed to prepare a path across the beach and through the tank barriers for the tanks.

d. The South Saskatchewan Battalion was to land as the first wave at POURVILLE, followed by the Cameroons of Canada Battalion as the second wave. They were to push on through the SCIE VALLEY, to swing to the East destroying the airport at ST AUBIN, and knock out the Divisional Command Post at ARQUES.

e. The 4th Commando was supposed to disembark at VARENCEVILLE and at the mouth of the SOMME, seize the 813th Battery, and withdraw to sea after accomplishing their task.

f. Every landing point was to be covered by protective fire from a destroyer. Two destroyers were supposed to slip into the harbour of DIEPPE and land troops directly.

g. After all tasks were accomplished, the withdrawal to the landing points, which would be carried out under cover of bombers, was to be effected in such a way that the reembarkation would be completed by 1530 hours.

6. Preparation:

a. The undertaking was prepared most conscientiously. The Operation Order is very detailed (121 typewritten pages) and, therefore difficult to visualize as a whole. The many code words used make it difficult to grasp in its entirety, and even more so to use as a basis for issuing orders in battle. The planning down to the last detail limits the independence of action of the subordinate

officer and leaves him no opportunity to make independent decisions in an altered situation.

b. The enemy had very good maps (clear printing and good paper) dated 1 August 1942, with fortifications clearly inserted, presumably the results of the evaluation of aerial photographs and possibly of reconnaissance by low-flying fighter planes. Corroboration by secret agents was evidently not carried out (e.g. The strength of the tank barriers in DIEPPE was not known. It was assumed that the 110th Infantry Division was in the sector and that Division Headquarters was located in ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE. There was a general lack of knowledge as to the location of regimental and battalion command posts.

7. Combat Efficiency of the Enemy:

a. The Second Canadian Division had lain for quite some time in the South of England, most of the time in camps. The troops were transported to the coast by truck on the afternoon of 18 August, loaded onto transports and shipped to the French Coast without being told either the objective or the mission, so that the ordinary soldiers were completely in the dark. The Canadians on the whole fought badly and surrendered afterwards in swarms.

b. On the other hand, the combat efficiency of the Commandos was very high. They were well trained and fought with real spirit. It is reported that they showed great skill in climbing the steep coastal cliffs.

8. Success of the Undertaking:

a. The Third Commando was repulsed at BERNEVAL by the Naval Signal Station and the Second Battery (Br Troop) of the 770th Army Coast Artillery Battalion. 80 men were taken prisoner by our Division.

b. The Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch were unsuccessful in their attempt to take the strongpoint at PUIITS. They were cut down by fire on the beach and suffered 150 dead. The remainder, consisting of some 300 men, surrendered.

c. The Essex Scottish Battalion, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal Battalion, the Canadian Engineers and the 14th Army Tank Battalion remained on the beach at DIEPPE in front of the anti-tank wall, and suffered high loses in dead and wounded.

d. The Canadian and South Saskatchewan Battalions succeeded in breaking through the strongpoint, but for some unaccountable reasons, proceeded no further, with the exception of a patrol sent to HAUTOT. 200 men were taken prisoner by the Division Reserve; the rest got away on the boats.

e. The Fourth Commando accomplished its mission (seizure of the 813th Battery) and reembarked.

9. Conclusions:

The operation failed, primarily because: in PUIITS the landing was repulsed, in DIEPPE the tanks did not succeed in crossing the anti-tank-wall, and near POURVILLE the British battalions did not continue their advance.

For the Corps HQ Staff
The Chief of the General Staff
signed: signature

Certified a true copy: Seidensticker

Captain and Personal Assistant
APPENDIX "B"

Corps Headquarters, LXXXI Army Corps 25 August 1942

Operations Officer

Nr. 640/42

COMBAT REPORT AND EXPERIENCES GAINED DURING THE
BRITISH ATTACK ON DIEPPE 19 AUGUST 1942

I - INITIAL SITUATION

1. Disposition of our own Division:

a. The dispositions of the 302nd Infantry Division made allowances for the 70 km wide Divisional sector, the nature of the coastline, and the steep slopes with numerous ravines leading down to the sea. Consequently, no continuous defence line was used but defences were concentrated round focal points, i.e., around the ports where landings were possible or probable. With the weak forces under our Command we knowingly didn't defend every ravine. With our troops posted as they were, we could not prevent the British from making temporary on the coast at BERNEVAL and VARENDEVILLE and obtaining local success with special, well-equipped troops.

b. Our main strategy is to be as strong as possible near the ports which form the focal points and on which our strongpoints are based, so that an attack from land and sea can be beaten off. Besides that, it is important to have as many mobile reserves as possible in order to be able to support strongpoints and initiate immediate counter-attacks against enemy troops that may have landed in between these strongpoints. It is all the more important to withhold strong reserves as in any large scale assault the enemy will certainly launch a simultaneous Air and Sea attack against our coastal defences: the air attack consisting of strong airborne and parachute forces.

c. The following troops were employed in the strongpoint area of DIEPPE itself, the 571st infantry Regiment - HQ, with two Infantry Battalions, HQ Engineer Battalion and two Engineer Companies, with Beach Defence guns and three 47 mm Anti-Tank guns which were manned by Infantry troops, the third Battalion (Br Battery) of the 302nd Artillery Regiment consisting of two Batteries (Br Troops) of Light Howitzers and two Batteries (Br Troops) carrying only equipment and supplies, and the 265th Heavy Infantry Howitzer Battery (Br Troop) for coastal defences.

2. Anti-Aircraft Units:

a. One heavy anti-aircraft battery of 75 mm (Br Troop).

b. One Section of 50 mm.

c. One Section of 37 mm.

d. Two Sections of 20 mm.

About 200 men of different naval units, 60 policemen and one experimental company of about 60 men. (Translator's note: possibly a penal detachment).

3. Corps Reserves:

- a. Regimental Headquarters 676th Infantry Regiment DOUDEVILLE.
- b. 1st Battalion, 676th Infantry Regiment in the HERICOURT area.
- c. 3rd Battalion, 676th Infantry Regiment in the YVETOT area.
- d. 3rd Battalion, 570th Infantry Regiment in the BACQUEVILLE area.
- e. 81st Tank Company in the YVETOT area.

These Corps reserves were in a position that enabled them to reach rapidly the areas of the 302nd Division or of the 332nd Infantry Division. These dispositions proved adequate on the 19th of August 1942.

The Artillery Battalion of the Corps reserve (1st Battalion 332nd Artillery) was used for local coastal protection near FECAMP and was drawn from there to the Corps Reserve.

THE BRITISH PLAN OF ATTACK

4. The British intention is clearly laid down in the detailed orders which were found. The British intended to put the coastal batteries near BERNEVAL and VARENGLVILLE out of action. For this purpose two Commando detachments of 250 and 350 men were used. This was undertaken to prevent these batteries from shelling the initial landing as well as the evacuation which was scheduled to be completed by 1530 hours in the afternoon.

5. The main objective was to be the strongpoint area of DIEPPE, where 7 Battalions, supported by special troops and one Army Tank Battalion (58 Tanks), were to be used.

6. Near Puits one Battalion with one Light Battery (Br Troop) and one Light Anti-Aircraft Assault Section (detachment) were to land in the first wave and another Battalion in the second wave.

7. One detachment was to attack the Anti-Aircraft emplacements at CAMP DE ROMAIN, which means that they were to swing Eastwards after landing.

8. Another detachment was to penetrate into PUIITS also, and was to attack all Anti-Aircraft emplacements along the coastal road from PUIITS to DIEPPE on

the hill to the East of the port.

9. The remainder of the Battalions were to swing Southwards from PUIITS, attack "A" Battery (un-manned) at the NEUVILLE crossroads, then occupy the DIEPPE gas works or electrical works which were to be destroyed by a special Engineer Detachment.

10. Near DIEPPE one Battalion with one Platoon (Br Troop) of tanks was to land due West of the port with their right flank on the street RUE DU DUQUESNE which was also the boundary line with the Fourth Battalion.

11. This Battalion had the task of occupying the rear areas of the port and BASIN OF KANDA, and to advance up to the racetrack, which they were to prepare for use as a landing ground.

12. At the same time two warships were to enter the port: the Destroyer LOCUST, and a Cutter.

13. Two more Battalions with an Army Tank Battalion, less one platoon (Br Troop) were to land on the DIEPPE BEACH West of the RUE DU DUQUESNE.

14. One Detachment supported by one Tank Platoon (Br Troop), was to attack the hill West of the Casino, push on in the direction of the coast road leading to POURVILLE and roll up the various battle headquarters located in that area.

15. Another Detachment, also supported by one Tank Platoon, was to advance through the town, in order to take the Anti-Aircraft positions and the positions of Battery "B" (un-manned) on the main road to LE HAVRE.

16. The remainder of the two Battalions, supported by one Tank Company, was to advance along the main road to ROUEN to the HQ of the Engineer Battalion on the Southern edge of the town and make contact with the Battalion on their left near the Anti-Aircraft positions East of the Engineer HQ.

17. In POURVILLE a sixth Battalion was to land in the first wave. One Company was to move from POURVILLE along the coastal road to DIEPPE and was to roll up from the West the Anti-Aircraft and air force positions along the coast.

18. The Second Company was to attack the farm of 4 VENTES on the East bank of the SCIE.

19. The Third Company was to advance along the West bank of the SCIE up to the Southern edge of POURVILLE.

20. The Fourth Company was to advance from POURVILLE along the coast up the high ground in order to take the machine gun position situated up there.

21. The Seventh Battalion was also to land at POURVILLE behind the Sixth Battalion which had to establish the bridgehead. (The perimeter of this bridgehead was formed by the Company objectives mentioned above). The Seventh Battalion was then to advance along the West bank of the SCIE in a Southwesterly direction to the air field of ST AUBIN. Subsequently it was to proceed Northeastward and take the positions of the 265th Battery (Br Troop) North of ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE where the Division HQ was presumed to be located.

22. It is not apparent whether further units were to land, should this attack have been successful. It is possible that the convoy of 26 large boats which left PORTSMOUTH about noon and which later on turned about, was to be the second wave, should the operation meet with success. This is also indicated by the fact that numerous prisoners said they support or relief from 1700 hours onwards.

23. The British had at their disposal excellent maps on which all the information obtained from aerial reconnaissance was plotted. This included the smallest detail of the German positions, and even the DIEPPE Anti-Tank walls, which separate the streets from the harbour promenade, were shown. All possibilities of ascent and descent were also clearly marked. However, these maps give no indication that the local French-British espionage has worked well. The locations of Regimental and other HQ's were unknown. Divisional HQ was presumed to be in ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE where it had been many months ago. The presence of the 110th Infantry Division was presumed, whereas the 302nd Infantry Division was actually engaged.

II - RECORD OF EVENTS

24. Twenty kilometres from DIEPPE, the English force encountered a German convoy at approximately 0500 hrs. As a result of the ensuing short naval engagement, the entire coast defence system was alerted. While the defensive forces were still in doubt whether the ships in front of DIEPPE were friendly or enemy, a series of concentrated air attacks began at dawn. These attacks were directed against positions on both side of DIEPPE. While the bombing and strafing attacks, which were obviously meant to pin down the coastal defences were still in progress, swarms of landing craft in waves of 40 to 50 headed for the shore out of the protection of the natural morning fogs and artificial smoke screens laid down by the attacking planes and naval fire from destroyers and landing craft. The fog and smoke screen prevented the artillery from destroying the landing craft while still off-shore. Hits were only registered by the artillery and heavy weapons on the landing craft, just before they

touched the beach. Fog and smoke made observation difficult even at the beach.

25. To the East of DIEPPE, the enemy had landed in the defiles at BERNEVAL, his strength presumably being that of a Commando party of 250 men. Their task was to seize and destroy the 2nd Battery (Br Troop) of the 770th Army Coast Artillery Battalion (Br Battery), which was emplaced there. By using rope ladders and guylines and similar mountaineering equipment, the enemy succeeded in climbing the steep cliffs of the ravines, avoiding the minefields (placed only in the ravines), and attacking the Battery (Br Troop). The Battery itself was located in a fortified strongpoint. It dispatched one machine gun patrol under an officer to the BERNEVAL ravine, where they took part in the local defence. Supported by the army anti-aircraft gun platoon stationed there, the Battery warded off the unco-ordinated attacks on its position. This was done in part by the direct fire at close range and by machine gun and rifle fire. The special Air Force installation (Radar?) and its crew of 100 men, in permanent support of the Battery, was also attacked, though in lesser degree, and drove off all attacks, also in part at close range.

26. As soon as the news of the attack at BERNEVAL became known, the 302nd Infantry Division ordered Major von Blycher, commander of the 302nd Anti-Tank Battalion, to launch an attack on BERNEVAL. Major von Blycher received, as well, command of the Bicycle Squadron from ST NICOLAS and the attached 3rd Pioneer Company (Temporarily motorised) from ARQUES LA BATAILLE. These were later reinforced by the 3rd Company of the 572nd Infantry Regiment, which had been ordered to ST MARTIN. The BERNEVAL Battery had warded off the enemy's close attack. Major von Blycher and the units of his command were able to destroy the enemy at BERNEVAL and to take 2 officers and 80 men prisoner.

27. The enemy launched a similar attack with an English Commando party of 300 men, west of DIEPPE, against the 813th Army Coastal Battery at VARENDEVILLE. These Commandos landed at the cliffs on both sides of VARENDEVILLE, under cover of a smoke screen. Another group, meanwhile, tried to land near the fortified strongpoint at QUIBERVILLE, where one platoon of the 3rd Company of the 571st Infantry Regiment was stationed. The attempted landing at QUIBERVILLE was frustrated by the concentrated fire of the 3rd Company of the 571st. On the other hand, the English Commandos in VARENDEVILLE were more successful. They were able to climb the cliffs at various points, where small, wooded, rugged ravines lead down to the sea. This is terrain where observation is difficult and progress is possible only for trained climbers.

28. These English forces - around three hundred non-attacked the 813th Battery from all sides with mortars, machine guns, machine pistols (submachine guns), and hand grenades. Meanwhile, continuous low-flying air attacks, using

full armament, held the Battery in check. By this means, the shells stored in ammunition pits, the battery emplacement, and even the guns themselves, were set on fire. The Battery defended itself valiantly until the very end.

Twenty-eight dead and 29 wounded testify to the brave defence. Among the latter was the Battery Commander, who directed fire from the observation post. Later, accompanied by the observation post section, he fought his way towards the fighting Battery. The Battery was temporarily seized by the English. However, the guns were for the most part unusable because of the burning of the shells.

29. The English Commandos presumably re-embarked at about 0900 hrs, taking with them 4 prisoners and number of their own dead and wounded.

30. Both operations, at BERNEVAL and at VARENCEVILLE, obviously had as their mission the destruction of the two heavy coastal batteries (Br Troop). This would have facilitated further debarkations and alter embarkations at DIEPPE.

31. Both of the army coastal batteries lie outside of the DIEPPE Defence Zone. It was impossible to give them special protection by infantry because of the lack of available troops. The dangerous position of the 813th Battery was known. Its inclusion in the DIEPPE Defence Zone was to have taken place shortly after the completion of the fixed emplacements.

III - THE MAIN ATTACK ON DIEPPE

32 ... developed on a broad front with three main thrusts: at PUIITS, at DIEPPE itself, and at POURVILLE.

33. The attack by the battalions landing PUIITS collapsed under the concentrated fire of the heavy weapons, with great loss to the enemy. Not a single English soldier was able to break through the defences. Flanking fire in front of the obstacles, on the high sea wall, and on the beach itself decimated his attacking lines. Aside from the numerous prisoners, over 150 dead were counted at this point.

34. The battalion, which landed from just west of DIEPPE to the Rue du Duquesne was destroyed on the beach promenade, along with all the tanks landed there. Around 0700 hrs, the destroyer, LOCUST, coming close to the harbour approaches, was caught in the fire of coast defence artillery and anti-aircraft guns. She received several direct hits, turned back in the fog, and was presumably sunk, since the stern of a large sinking ship with some 200 or 300 men on board was observed during a moment when the fog had lifted. The situation was no different for the two battalions which, reinforced by tanks, landed with the main body on both sides of the Casino. They and their tanks were destroyed while landing on the beach or on the beach promenade, together with the landed tanks. With the exception of a few patrols, they were unable

to penetrate into the City. The 6th Battalion, on the other hand, had more success under cover of darkness and fog. They were able to penetrate westwards into POURVILLE, where they overpowered the weak garrison. (1 Platoon of Infantry and a few men of the Todt organization.) The battalion then tried to reach its designated objectives. Two companies moving westward out of POURVILLE along the coastal road, rolled up the positions in the SCIE VALLEY. They succeeded in getting as far as the anti-tank position which they disabled temporarily by direct hits, and possibly by hand grenades. Most of the gun crew was killed. Elements of the English penetrated the SCIE DAM, but while attempting to push forward to the northern part of the 4 Ventes Farm, they were wiped out.

35. Both companies were unsuccessful in breaking through the main line of resistance.

36. The main DIEPPE defences really begin at this anti-tank position. POURVILLE was only a lightly held advanced outpost.

37. The two other companies operated west of the SCIE RIVER. They apparently attained their first objective, since they seized the southern edge of POURVILLE and the machine gun position on the hill west of POURVILLE, where they established a bridgehead.

38. The Seventh Battalion was to follow the Sixth Battalion in landing and to push forward on the west bank of the SCIE up to the airfield at ST AUBIN. The Battalion advanced in the wooded close country on the hills west of the SCIE, from POURVILLE, as far as the vicinity of HAUTOT. It was caught in the flanking fire coming from 4 Ventes Farm. It then encountered the forward Bicycle Platoon of the Regimental Headquarters of the 571st Infantry Regiment and some patrols from the 1st Battalion of the same Regiment. Until then the Battalion had encountered no serious German opposition, there being no German defence set up in the area. It is, therefore, not apparent why this Battalion only got as far as HAUTOT and could not accomplish its mission, which was to push on towards the ST AUBIN airfield. Presumably, it was halted by the commander of the English Forces, because the frontal attacks on DIEPPE and PUIITS had failed.

39. The English operations order states that, after landing, troops were supposed to reach their assigned objectives by 1230 and march back to re-embark from 1230 on. Re-embarkation was supposed to be completed by 1550 hrs.

40. Up until midday, many more boats kept landing on the beach at DIEPPE. In the smoke screen, it could not be seen whether they were bringing up more troops or loading up with soldiers already landed.

IV - MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DIVISION AND BY CORPS

41. Soon after 0600 hrs, the full scope of the attack became known, and it was apparent that no attacks were taking place at the mouth of the SOMME, in LE TREPORT or in the sector of the 332nd Infantry Division. Therefore, the Division - as stated above - sent the Bicycle Troop (Br Squadron) and the reinforced 3rd Pioneer Company from ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE to BERNEVAL. Under command of Major von blyher, they were to relieve the BERNEVAL battery, then under attack.

42. At 0710 hrs, the 571st Infantry Regiment in DIEPPE ordered its First Battalion in QUIBERVILLE to prepare in the region of HAUTOT for an attack in the direction of POURVILLE.

43. LXXXI Corps ordered "Second Stage" Alert for all divisions and corps reserves. At 0730 hrs, Corps placed the 3rd Battalion of the 570th Infantry Regiment, which was in BACQUEVILLE, at the disposal of the 302nd Infantry Division and ordered it to proceed to OFFRANVILLE. The remainder of the Corps Reserve (Headquarters) of the 676th Infantry plus its 1st and 3rd Battalions, the 1st Battalion (Br Battery) of the 332nd Artillery Regiment, and the 81st Tank Company) received the order to move to BACQUEVILLE (14 kilometres southwest of DIEPPE).

44. Towards 1000 hrs the 1st Battalion of the 571st Infantry was prepared in the HAUTOT area for the attack on POURVILLE. The Battalion found itself in an unclear situation because of the close country. It reconnitered in the direction of POURVILLE and VARENGEVILLE. The Battalion opened its attack on POURVILLE around 1130 hrs. It was able to clear the enemy out of the hill West of POURVILLE and to take about 200 prisoners.

45. Around noon, the Regimental Commander of the 571st Infantry Regiment took steps to clear up the situation in DIEPPE. He ordered the 5th and parts of the 11th Companies and 2/3 of the 2nd Pioneer Company of the 302nd to launch a counter-attack and mop up the troops on the beach. It was possible by this attack to force the completely dazed English landing troops to surrender. Hundreds of prisoners were taken.

46. In the meantime, all Corps Reserves had been placed at the disposal of the 302nd Infantry Division. They were ordered to OFFRANVILLE with the intention of launching an attack out of OFFRANVILLE in the direction of POURVILLE, along with the 81st Tank Company. By that time, however, the 1st Battalion of the 571st Infantry Regiment had cleared the enemy from the area West of POURVILLE. Therefore, the attack by the Corps Reserve was never carried out.

47. The Corps Reserve (676th Infantry Regiment) was committed in the afternoon in the POURVILLE - ST AUBIN sector, using two of its battalions on the coast and one in reserve. This was done because of the many messages on hand reporting strong formations of ships on route from England. Therefore, the possibility that the British attack would be renewed had to be reckoned with.

48. At 0950 hrs, the 10th Armoured Division was placed under the command of the LXXXI Corps, and received the order to move its advanced detachment (one reinforced battalion) as fast as possible up into the area of TORCY LE PETIT (14 kilometres south of DIEPPE). the remainder of the Division was supposed to follow to the area of NEUFCHATEL - LONDINIERES. The Commanding General intended to commit the 10th Armoured Division west of the ARQUES River against those enemy troops which had landed at POURVILLE. This decision depended on whether or not the other German forces had been successful by that time in pushing the enemy there back into the sea. Thereafter, the General intended, if necessary, to direct the Division towards the East.

49. The Commanding General gave the following order at 1200 hrs to the 10th Armoured and the 302nd Infantry Divisions:

a. The 10th Armoured Division with its advanced elements and those units already committed from the 302nd Infantry Division and Corps Reserves, first attacks the heights west of POURVILLE. It is to destroy the enemy, and then join in the attack from the West of and in DIEPPE, if this is necessary.

b. Boundary between the 302nd and the 10th Divisions: from the Western edge of POURVILLE to JANVALL to the SCIE VALLEY.

c. Those parts of the 302nd Infantry Division and Corps Reserve which have already advanced to the West of this line will be attached to the 10th Armoured Division.

d. One reinforced Panzer-Grenadier Regiment at the disposition of Corps remains to the South and in the vicinity of LONDINIERES.

c. The Divisions will make mutual arrangements for the time at which 10th Armoured Division assumes tactical control.

50. However, the 10th Armoured Division did not go into action, but was ordered at 1345 hrs to stand by at the disposal of Corps HQ in the area TORCY LE PETIT - NEUFCHATEL - LONDINIERES.

51. The 10th Armoured Division remained in the combat zone during the night 19-20 Aug 1942.

V - WHAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT BRITISH FAILURE?

52. The British completely miscalculated the strength of the German defence and tried to "grab the bull by the horns" by landing the main body of their invasion forces, particularly the tanks, right in front of DIEPPE. They persisted with this plan although they were aware of the strength of the DIEPPE street defences, concrete constructions, anti-tank walls, machine gun positions, and coastal guns. This we know from their maps. It is also inconceivable why they did not support the battalions which landed near POURVILLE with tanks. An attack with tanks from POURVILLE against the hill west of DIEPPE and against the "4 VENTES" Farm might have been successful, although it would have been most difficult to overcome the anti-tank walls, the pier and the SCIE dam.

52. Contrary to all expectation, the British did not employ Parachutists and Airborne troops. If they had attacked PUIITS simultaneously with Airborne troops and from the sea, the initial position of the defenders of PUIITS would probably have been critical.

53. The British must have expected that the massed employment of the Air Force against the coastal defence of DIEPPE would shatter the German defence to such an extent, as to enable the assault battalions to break through the coastal defence. It is probable that the heavy smoke screen over DIEPPE considerably diminished the accuracy of hits, and the effect of the British air attacks.

54. They did land light and heavy mortars, but their entire combat order mentioned only one light battery (Br Troop) and one light anti-aircraft section which was to be landed near PUIITS. As this landing failed, this artillery was not actually employed. A few light assault guns would probably have been more use to the British in their first attack, than the tanks. Since fire control observation on the big ships was poor because of the smoke screen, the landing force had no artillery support whatsoever.

55. It is astonishing that the British should have underestimated our defence, as they had details of most of it from air-photos; equally striking is the short time in which they expected to carry out the operation.

56. The British operational order of about 100 pages fixed every detail of the action for each unit. This method of planning made the failure of the whole raid inevitable in the event of unexpected difficulties.

57. The British attack at DIEPPE failed, with heavy enemy losses, thanks to the courageous defensive action taken by all branches of the armed forces. Ninety-five officers and 2122 men were captured by the Germans. By 24 August, 475 dead were buried. The tide is still washing ashore more corpses. A high percentage of enemy losses, which cannot, however, be estimated, was incurred at sea through our artillery fire and aerial bombardment, and through the sinking of landing craft, flat-bottomed boats, and destroyers. Total enemy losses probably amount to at least 60-70 of the landing force.

58. Our losses:

a. 302nd Inf Div:

(1) 5 Officers, 14 NCOs, 68 EM (Other Ranks) dead.

(2) 1 NCO, 9 EM (Other Ranks) missing.

(3) 5 Officers, 27 NCOs, 124 EM (Other Ranks) wounded.

b. Total losses: (Army, Navy, Air Force, Organization Todt)

(1) 6 Officers, 144 NCOs and EM (Other Ranks) dead.

(2) 15 NCOs and EM (Other Ranks) missing.

(3) 5 Officers, 270 NCOs and EM (Other Ranks) wounded.

59. Captured enemy equipment:

a. 28 Tanks 170 Machine Guns

b. 7 Reconnaissance Cars 60 Machine Pistols

c. 1 Personnel Truck 42 Anti-Tank Rifles

d. 1300 Rifles 70 Light Mortars

60 Heavy Mortars

and a large amount of ammunition, hand grenades, explosives, and other equipment.

VII - CRITIQUE

60. Disposition of Troops. If the British attacks us again on the same scale, or on a broader front, it is to be expected that they will attempt to

penetrate weak spots and try to encircle the harbours. They are not likely to report a massed frontal attack against a strongly fortified area, as in the DIEPPE attack of August 19th, 1942. It is therefore most important that we have mobile reserves ready for a counter-attack. These mobile reserve must be equipped with many motorised anti-tank weapons, some of which are still lacking.

61. Sector Reserves. Regimental and sector reserves should be held in close support and be supplied with heavy weapons and artillery insofar as is possible. Reserve battalions which are in dispersed billets, must be assembled at the very latest by the time the "Second Stage" Alarm is sounded. These reserves must start counter-attacking promptly and automatically and not wait for orders in unclear situations. The quickest way to clarify the situation is to initiate a forceful attack to prevent the enemy from consolidating his position. Moreover, a prompt counter-attack by our reserves leaves the reserves from higher formations free to support units which have been unable to cope with their situation. An illustration of a counter-attack which should have been launched sooner, is provided by the experiences of the 1st Battalion, 571st Infantry Regiment. This Battalion was informed at 0710 that the British attack on QUIBERVILLE had been repulsed and that the British had succeeded in landing at POURVILLE. The battalion was ordered by the regiment to prepare to launch an attack from HAUTOT. However, the situation remained obscure for some time in the close country Southwest of POURVILLE and everywhere the battalion patrols ran into fire. A prompt and determined attack towards POURVILLE would probably have cleared up the situation more quickly and would have helped wipe out even larger numbers of the enemy near POURVILLE.

62. Corps Reserves. The corps reserves were alerted without difficulties. Yet, their assembly and entrucking took too much time. The transport columns had been kept too concentrated in the area of the reserves; it will be necessary to distribute them closer to the troops. Allotment of transport to the battalions and the artillery must be tactically closer. It becomes necessary to assign artillery to the corps reserves at all times. Part of their artillery must always be limbered up to permit rapid commitment with the corps reserves. The corps reserve artillery battalion, which was on the coast, came too late because of the time it took to limber up and entruck. It would be desirable to move corps reserves closer to the coast and to attach certain reserve units to Divisions as in the past. This would be possible if the corps, in case of an enemy attack, could count on the support of one motorized or armoured division.

63. Landing of Tanks. Experience has proved that the British are able to land tanks on beach from their special landing craft within a very short time. Therefore, the defence has to provide for more anti-tank defences, even in the

small ravines through which paths run down to the coast, e.g., near CRIEL-QUIBERVILLE-ST AUBIN-VEULETTES, etc. The heavy gravel on the DIEPPE beach certainly rendered the landing of British tanks more difficult, but did not prevent it. This has been proved by the fact that several tanks were moved over the gravel without difficulty, after they had been repaired. Witnesses reported that many more tanks (probably 16) had reached the promenade along the beach, but that they turned around and recrossed the gravel to find more protection against the heavy defensive fire behind the gravel bank.

64. Anti-tank Defence. The passive anti-tank defence, furnished by anti-tank walls, has stood the test. The walls have to be sited in such a way that their flanks can be covered by our own machine gun fire, thus preventing enemy sappers from approaching them, and planting explosive. It would be desirable to stagger these walls in depth in case the enemy should succeed in breaking through the first line. Active anti-tank defences rest all insufficient. The armour of Anglo-American tanks in most instances, was not penetrated by the 37 mm shells. So far only two holes from 37 mm shells have been discovered; one in the rear and one at the side of a captured tank. Many traces of hits have been found, but it has been impossible to determine the calibre of the shells which caused them. On the other hand, it appears that the track of Anglo-American tanks are more vulnerable to anti-tank fire.

65. Artillery. The beach defence guns stood the test very well. Greater numbers (two or three times as many) would be desirable. If these weapons were to be provided, war establishments would have to be changed because the infantry does not possess sufficient personnel to man them. The guns should be emplaced in such a manner that they can provide short range flanking fire without being hit by fire from the sea.

66. Army Coast Artillery. Corps headquarters has given orders for the displacement of coast artillery guns into the defence sectors, if possible, into the vicinity of infantry strongpoints. Independent fire has proved superior to controlled fire, (Langbasisverfahren), in actions against a stationary fleet of landing craft. Coordination Between Artillery and Other Branches of the Armed Forces Army coast artillery positions opened fire independently, because the naval commander's permission to fire arrived only about two hours after the beginning of the engagement.

67. Attacks from the Air. Aerial attacks, which were carried out with bombs and guns in continuous waves, did not produce the expected effect on our batteries and AA positions. The reason probably was that the British themselves, in order to blind the defences, had laid such a heavy smoke screen that the accuracy of their own weapons and target recognition was considerably reduced.

68. Coordination. Coordination with other branches of the armed forces and with the TODT Construction Organization was excellent and frictionless. All men participating in the action completely fulfilled their duties.

Coordination with fighter and pursuit plane commands, was carried out by Corps Headquarters with Jafy~~2~~, Jafy~~3~~, IX Fliegerkorps and the liaison officer of Luftflotte 3 at Army Group. It would be useful to designate a single command post for the coordination of all echelons. This command post, with sufficient communications facilities, would be the only one to make enquiries at corps and would help to avoid an overcrowding of signal channels. Infantry training of Navy and Air Force personnel engaged in ground fighting should be continued.

69. Mine Fields. Not all of the mine fields in the various small ravines were as effective as expected. Reasons for this deficiency are still being examined. The British succeeded in by-passing the mine fields. Mine fields must extend in width beyond the ravines. No wires must be viable on the seaward side. The first wave of the British attacking PUIITS was caught in a mine field. This made it possible to kill 50 to 60 men by machine gun fire.

70. Signal Communications. On the whole, the transmission of orders and reports functioned satisfactorily. This kept the Division and Corps Headquarters continuously informed of the progress of the battle. It must be borne in mind, however, that the British did not attempt to destroy command posts and message centres of divisional and lower headquarters. This calls for the establishment of message centres along a line running parallel to the coast at a distance of about 10 km. These message centres must be at junctions of main roads leading to the shore and should be on a single telephone network with Division and Corps Headquarters. This would make it possible to reach reserve units committed in the combat zone by telephone at all times. The control of reserves, approaching from the rear or flanks, would then be much easier. The batteries (Br Troop) need a third radio set. Forward observers had to be connected by telephones making for slow fire control. Radio communications by Decimeter Set between the 770th Army Coast Artillery Battalion and the 813th Battery (Br Troop) functioned at all times and stood the test very well. It is important to overcome still existing reluctance to the employment of radio communications.

71. Civilian Traffic. In case of a "Second Stage" Alarm, all civilian traffic in the combat zone must be stopped immediately. French motor vehicles were actually going into and out of DIEPPE during the battle. Civil telephone communications must also be suspended in the L of C area.

VII - SERVICES OF SUPPLY

72. General. Insofar as conclusions can be drawn from the short action, all preparatory measures worked well. No difficulties arose during the action or during the later replenishment of divisional supplies. Mutual contact was sufficient for the handling of all problems. Cooperation with the senior transport officer was satisfactory. As in most actions of this type, the greatest difficulties were encountered during the cleanup of the combat area, after the engagement. Clear orders and quick organisation were lacking during this phase. So far as it was possible, Corps Headquarters issued the necessary orders on the following day through normal supply channels. Too many sections from higher headquarters interfered after the battle. This increased the difficulties for the troops at DIEPPE.

73. Ammunition

a. Supply. The allotment of two or even three units of fire to the Infantry, Heavy Weapons and to the Artillery proved sufficient, despite the fact that as is always the case with troops fighting for the first time, and facing good targets, rates of consumption were above average.

b. Storage. Based on information available so far, it is necessary to store ammunition in concrete or reinforced dumps. Such dumps must be dispersed to protect them against enemy air attacks with incendiary bombs.

c. Re-supply. Army headquarters ordered the replenishment of ammunition supplies for the division by rail because the British had withdrawn and no further large scale enemy activity was expected. The replenishment of ammunition was almost complete on the evening of 21 August 1942.

74. Rations. The short engagement did not permit an opportunity for drawing any experiences in the supply of rations, etc. Available supplies were sufficient.

75. Medical Service. The medical services of the division, particularly the evacuation of casualties, were excellently prepared. The first hospital train arrived at ROUEN as early as 0130 hours, 20 August 1942, and the wounded were admitted to the General Hospital. It remains to be decided whether it wouldn't be better for the division to evacuate its wounded to the hospitals in both ROUEN and AMIENS since the former is insufficiently equipped to deal with large number of wounded during a limited period of time. Medical installations in the area of the Corps are insufficient. Hospitals in ROUEN were already over-crowded after this engagement.

76. Veterinary Service. It was impossible to draw conclusions of any importance. Losses of horses are known, but the total number employed in the action is not known at the time. It is therefore impossible to calculate the percentage of losses.

77. Todt Construction Organisation Columns. The success of the withdrawal of Todt columns from the coast and their further employment for the loading of troops and transportation of supplies exceeded expectations. The quick work of Staffelführer Jakobsen of the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Transport Corps) in the area of the 711th Infantry Division deserves special mention. Enough cargo space had been concentrated by the Quartermaster in the ROUEN area to enable the supply system to meet all eventualities.

78. Fuel. The supply of fuel offered no difficulties. Only the replenishment of fuel supplies for vehicles operating on coal-gas was difficult, since there was no exact list of plants producing charcoal or their capacity.

79. Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war were evaluated without difficulties.

80. Captured Materiel and Equipment. The salvage of captured materiel and equipment, as usual, is proceeding very slowly because of lack of personnel. Special difficulties are resulting from the presence of many live explosive charges and the fact that all weapons are loaded. The Division has established a collecting point for captured materiel and equipment in accordance with existing regulations.

81. Weapons and Equipment. Losses of weapons and equipment:

- a. 6 - 150mm coast artillery guns
- b. 2 - French field pieces, Model 231
- c. 2 - 37mm anti-tank guns
- d. 2 - Czech 37mm anti-tank guns
- e. 3 - Light machine guns, Model 34
- f. 2 - Spare barrels for Czech 47mm anti-tank guns
- g. 2 - Trucks
- h. 1 - Field Kitchens

Signed
General of Armoured Troops

320th Inf Div Div hq, 3 Sept 1942
Ops. Sect. Nr. 1036/42 Secret 25 Copies
1 incl. .. Copy

Supplementary remarks and maps of the division to follow.

for the CG
C. of S.
Distribution Signature
A(Regiments 4 Copies)
CG, Ops. officer
Supply Officers
Intelligence officer
APPENDIX "C"

Corps HQ LXXXIV Army Corps Corps HQ 2 September 1942
Operations Sect. Nr. 1841/42 secret

Reference: HQ LXXXIV Army Corps, Operations Sect. 1787/42 secret dated
29 August 1942

Subject: Combat report and experiences gained by the LXXXI Army Corps
during the British attack on Dieppe August 19th 1942

Additions made by the LXXXIC Corps to the combat report and the experiences
gained by the LXXXI Corps during the British attack on Dieppe.

REFERENCE VI. - EXPERIENCES:

Paragraphs a) to d) Order of Battle and Reserves

1. Batteries or Platoons of Artillery (Br. Troops or Sections) should
be allotted to the reserve Battalions. Trucks should be parked
near the reserve Battalions in order that their personnel and
personnel from the attached Artillery can be entrucked without
delay in the event of an alert. In the event of a "Second-Stage"
Alarm, the reserve Battalions will assemble according to the plan
laid down in paragraph 4.

2. Trucks for transporting equipment, heavy infantry weapons and MG
ammunition must be allotted to companies equipped with bicycles,
in order to avoid frequent breakdowns resulting from overloading
of bicycles.

3. Anti-Tank weapons in sufficient numbers must be allotted to reserve Battalions. Anti-tank companies should be held in reserve in order that they can be employed against the main enemy tank attack.

Divisions and Corps reserve units will report by the 10th of September 1942 on the following:

a) The allotment of detachments from their 14th Companies to the reserve Battalions. Strength and weapons strength will be stated.

b) The allotment of Anti-Tank rifles, grenade-dischargers, Bangalore torpedoes and T-Mines to the reserve Battalions.

c) The practicability of allotting more fixed Anti-Tank guns with a Calibre greater than 3.7mm. The numbers and type of the weapons will be stated.

4. In the event of a "Second-Stage" Alarm, the Battalion of the Corps reserve will assemble and be ready to advance into action. As the Battalions may be committed in any one of several directions, according to the tactical situation, convenient assembly points will be selected beforehand in preparation for an advance in either of the three main directions, North, East, and West. A sector of a street or a side street will be allotted to each Company so that the departure from the assembly area will be carried out promptly and smoothly. The approach routes to these assembly areas and the marching time will be laid down beforehand in order to avoid columns crossing each other. Troops will only assemble at these points when a "Second-Stage" Alarm giving North, East, or West has been sounded. If this additional direction is not included in the alarm, Corps reserve units will assemble in their quarters as in a "First-Stage" Alarm and be ready to march off. The assembly points selected according to these instructions will be reported to Corps Headquarters by the 6th of September 1942.

5. Reserve Battalions, particularly Divisional Reserve Battalions, will in most cases go into action at a period when the tactical situation is obscure. Since the success of a counter-attack is dependent upon its speed of execution, there is no time available for systematic reconnaissance. The best reconnaissance is an attack which assures against surprise by the employment of active advance guard patrols and by holding back a reserve. However the

enemy is as ignorant of the tactical situation as we are, and if we launch an early counter attack we have the initiative.

Paragraphs d) and e) Anti-Tank Defence

Anti-Tank obstacles must be surrounded with barbed wire to prevent the enemy from climbing over them. They must also be covered by flanking fire from MG's so that enemy sappers cannot blow them up. In this connection refer to LXXXIV Corps Operations instruction 1743/42 of the 24th of August 1942, paragraphs 1 to 7.

Paragraph f) Action against Targets at Sea.

This will be carried out with the aid of the Radar equipment. The Naval Commander of the Normandy Sector has given instructions that the readings of the Naval Radar units should be sent to him as well as to the Central Radar station. The Naval Commander is also kept informed of the evaluation of Radar reading, and he will transmit this information to Corps and Divisional Headquarters.

Paragraph i) Mine Fields.

Mine Fields blocking the entrances to ravines and passes will be examined to see if there is any possibility of their being by-passed. If necessary these mine fields will be extended beyond the ravines.

Mines which are laid as protection against Infantry in places which are not within the field of our observed fire, must be contact mines, because the enemy makes a regular practice of cutting through trip wires.

Devices used to mark mine fields may be removed from the side of the mine field nearest the enemy if there is absolutely no danger of sentries walking along this outer side. Otherwise all mine fields must have the boundary nearest the enemy clearly indicated for the safety of our own troops. Patrols frequently pass along the enemy side of mine fields.

Paragraph k) (1) Staff Organization Liaison and Communication

Unit staff officers and assistants to commanders must organize within their staffs a system for liaison and communication with subordinate units, neighbouring units, and other services.

Combat reports form the basis of the commander's decisions. It is therefore necessary to make a clear distinction between facts, assumptions and deductions.

(2) Orders for the establishment of Message Centers referred to in Part VI, paragraph k, (Signals) are to follow.

Add to Part VII: Supply:

Paragraph a) General:

Divisions will check the measures taken for bringing up to the front and evacuating all types of material and supplies and will report on necessary improvements. This inspection will cover the storage of all supplies, and make a particular check to ensure that ammunition is stored safely.

Paragraph b) AMMUNITION

(1) Ammunition on Hand:

Although a sufficient stock has been built up, temporary shortages are bound to arise owing to the increased consumption of units in heavy engagements. Divisions will therefore arrange for mobile reserves of ammunition and check the organization for bringing up ammunition to the front lines,

(3) Apart from the Divisional Ammunition dumps, ammunition can be obtained from the Ammunition MICHEL. The Army intends to send forward ammunition trains to the edge of the zone of operations on the coast, whenever the circumstances permit.

Paragraph d) Medical Services

Casualties from the area of the 716th Infantry Division will be evacuated to the Base Hospital or the Collecting Station at CAEN. Subsequent evacuation will be organized by Army. It is intended to move the General Hospital at CAEN to AGENTAN or ALENCON and to establish in its place at CAEN an enlarged Station Hospital with a Surgery Units of the 320th Infantry Division and the 319th Infantry Division, located on the mainland North of the line and the COUTANCES - ST. LO will evacuate their casualties via the Army Dressing Stations either to the Station Hospital or to the collecting point for lightly wounded at ST. LO. Further evacuation will be regulated by Army. Casualties occurring South of the line COUTANCES - ST. LO. will be evacuated to a small collecting station which will be established later; its location will be announced. Casualties from the 319th Infantry Division on the Islands will be evacuated as long as ships are still sailing through to the collecting stations at ST. MALO to the General Hospital at RENNES, or by JUNKERS Hospital planes directly to RENNES, or PARIS. The employment of Hospital trains will be ordered by Army according to circumstances.

Paragraph f) UNITS OF THE "TODT" ORGANIZATION:

The divisions will supervise the provisions made for the evacuation of workers of the TODT Organization in case of alarm. They will report by 15 Sept 1942 how many vehicles of the TODT Organization will be

available after the evacuation of the workers and how these vehicles will be used.

Paragraph g) FUEL:

The following dumps will be available to supply army vehicles with fuel:

1) The Railway filling stations at NOYERS, VALOGNES, CONDE SUR VIRE, and CERENCES,

2) the reserve dump (Sperrlager) at COUVAINS.

In order to facilitate the supplying of divisions, Corps Headquarters has arranged that Army keeps the Railway filling stations available as long as possible. A sufficient supply of red fuel coupons should be maintained.

Paragraph h) HANDLING OF PRISONERS OF WAR:

The following divisional PW cages will be established:

716th Infantry Division: at CORMELLES, near CAEN, and near ISIGNY

320th Infantry Division: at VALOGNES and COUTANCES

319th Infantry Division: at GRANVILLE

It is intended to establish a transit camp at ST. LO and a permanent cage at RENNES.

Prisoners will be brought to the divisional cages by field troops. The division will provide for the guarding of prisoners in their cages.

Prisoners from the cages at CAEN, ISIGNY, VALOGNES will be evacuated by personnel of the transit camp at ST. LO. Prisoners from the cages at COUTANCES and GRANVILLE will be evacuated by personnel of the permanent cage at RENNES.

Paragraph i) CAPTURED MATERIEL:

The divisions will establish a roster of troops for salvaging captured materiel in the various sectors and will designate the necessary number of collecting points. The salvage troops will be equipped with vehicles; they will be given trained personnel to avoid accidents during the salvaging process and from explosions. The evacuation of captured materiel from the collecting points will be taken care of by Corps Headquarters.

For the Corps Headquarters

The Chief of Staff

signed von OPPEN

Indorsement:

320th Inf Div. Div Hq, 5 Sept 1942

Operations Officer No. 1058/42 SECRET 25 copies

12th copy

For the Commanding General
Cofs

Distribution:

A (however 4 to Regt)
CG, Ops Officer, Supply Officers
Intell. Officer

320th Infantry Division

Operations Officer Division Headquarters
5 September 1942

SUBJECT: Comments by Division: -

REFERENCE: Secret Document Number 1058/42, dated 2 September 42, from
Operations Officer, 320th Infantry Division

Comments by Division:

To Part VI:

To Paragraphs a) to d):

To Section 1:

"Recommendations herein contained have already been carried out."

To Section 2:

"CF. confidential document Number 2266/42 from Commanding General
and Operations Officer, 320th Infantry Division. Reports should
make particular mention of the distribution of trucks to companies
equipped with bicycles."

To Section 3:

"Reports in conformity with Section 3, Subsections b) and c) will
be submitted by 8 September 42. "The question of attaching a
platoon of the 14th Company to the Division Reserve is being
considered."

To Section 4:

"The assembly areas mentioned in confidential document No. 529/42,
dated 30 June 42, from the Operations Officer of the Second
Battalion, 585th Infantry Regiment are herewith countermanded.
Assembly areas, which can be easily camouflaged, will be located
in such a way as to permit the immediate departure of troops.

a) towards the East

b) towards the South

c) towards the West.

"Reports will be submitted by 8 September 42."

To Paragraphs d) and e):

"Reports will be submitted, with sketch, by 15 September 42, regarding anti-tank walls which are not yet protected by barbed wire and covered by machine gun fire."

To Paragraph i):

"Of Paragraph 2, Confidential Document Number 2247/42, dated 29 August, from the Operations Officer (Engineer Section) and Supply Officer, 320th Infantry Division. "Minefields, whose forward boundaries are not on sentry routes, will be reported to Division HQ.

To Paragraph k):

"The staff organisation which has been set up for cases of alarm will be re-examines. A new allocation of duties which would ensure the speedier transmission of messages will be considered.

To Part VII:

To Paragraph a):

"Of. Confidential Document Number 758/42, dated 28 August 42, from 320th Infantry Division. (Sent only to 586th Infantry Regiment; Division Supply Column Officer 320th Infantry Division)."

To Paragraph d):

"Of, Confidential Document Number 422/42, dated 26 August 42, from the Operations Officer, Supply Officer and Medical Officer. (Sent only to 586th Infantry Regiment; Division Supply Column Officer 320th Infantry Division)."

To Paragraph f):

"To be taken care of by the Division (Supply Officer). The report must be ready by 13 September 42.

To Paragraph h):

"Of. Confidential Document Number 726/42 dated 25 August 42, from the Intelligence and Supply Officers, 320th Infantry Division."

To Paragraph i):

"A roster will be prepared by Division Supply Officer by 15 September 42."

Distribution:

A) Regiment, 4 copies
Commanding General, Operations Officer
Supply Officer (equipment), Supply Officer (rations), Medical Officer, and Veterinary Officer
Intelligence Officer

Corps H.Q., LXXXIV Army Corps H.Q., 11 September 1942
Operations Sect. No. 1965/42 SECRET
2nd copy

Reference: Secret order HQ LXXXIV Army Corps Ops. Sect., No. 1743/42, dated 24 August, 1942

SUBJECT: Experiences from the Dieppe raid.

TO: 320th Inf Div

1. The Divisions will send the results of their investigations regarding the construction of anti-tank walls in places along the coast to 11th Fortress Engineer Battalion which, in collaboration with the Divisions, will determine the schedule and the extent of the work necessary.
2. For the time being, only those of the walls surveyed according to the secret report by the 11th Fortress Engineer Battalion, No. 274/42, dated Sept 42, will be built which are in particularly weak sectors: (Napoleon Quai and South of the coastal railway station). In constructing these walls, the technical experiences gained at Dieppe (see remark No. 12 in secret letter from Corps, No. 1917/42, dated 6 Sept 42) will be made use of.
3. The 320th Inf Div, in cooperation with the Navy, will reinforce the road barrier (Trossensperre) at GATTEVILLE.
4. In the event of an alert, mobile reserves will load only such equipment as is needed in combat. Office, workshop and sheltering equipment will be left behind under guard.
5. Dummy installations will not be constructed too close to actual installations so that the latter are not hit by artillery fire directed against the former. Dummy installations will be constructed in such a manner

that they do not obstruct the field of fire of our own weapons, even if these are fired from the rear of the combat zone. Dummy installations will be mined in order to prevent the enemy from using them. Actual installations must not be so close to each other that several of them are put out of a action in one enemy concentration of fire.

6. Military Police troops cannot be employed in the defence of particular localities whenever a "Second-Stage" Alarm sounds, because they are needed for other duties. (Eg. traffic control during the moving up of reserves). They may be employed for the protection of their own stations only if these stations are in immediate danger.

For the Corps Commander
Chief of Staff
Signature

320th Infantry Division Division HQ 18 Sept 1942
Operations Section, No. 1111/42 Secret 20 Copies
-- Copy

For Information and Guidance:

The 320th Engineer Battalion will undertake, in collaboration with the Naval Commandant of Normandy, the examination and reinforcing of the hawser barrier (Trossensperre) in Gatteville. The 320th Engineer Battalion will report completion of this assignment to the Division by 1 October.

For the Commanding General,
Chief of General Staff

Distribution

B (less Supply Troops)
Operations and Supply Officers

For Information:
Naval Commandant of Normandy with respect to paragraph 2.